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The American Lawyer and
The International Court of Justice
John M. Raymond *
The average American lawyer has only a vague idea about the International
Court of Justice. He knows the courts of his own state and probably the federal
courts of his district, but relatively few attorneys will ever have occasion to bring
a case before the International Court of Justice located at The Hague. A surpris-
ingly large number of American lawyers are also somewhat skeptical of the
existence of international law. As a result the practicing attorney has not taken
the interest in the Court that it deserves.
Lawyers should be the leaders of their communities. With the increasing
public awareness of international affairs, the attorney who can speak with knowl-
edge of the International Court of Justice will find his stature in the community
enhanced. Furthermore, the organized American bar has been taking a vital
interest in the terms of the acceptance by the United States of the compulsory
jurisdiction of this Court-the so-called Connally Amendment problem. No
attorney should remain ignorant of the facts and issues involved in this area.
Every lawyer, as a matter of principle, wants to see controversies settled in
accordance with legal rights and obligations. International controversies are no
exception. It is this basic philosophy that led to the establishment by the Ameri-
can Bar Association of a Special Committee on World Peace through Law with
Charles S. Rhyne, one of its former Presidents, as Chairman. Through the efforts
of this committee regional conferences of lawyers and leaders of the countries of
the world are being held to discuss the problem, with a view to having later a
world conference to develop and finalize a concrete program of action. Other
efforts to attack the problem of establishing a rule of law in the world are also
being undertaken, notably by the World Rule of Law Center at Duke University.
While some of the proposals may be over-optimistic and perhaps seem impractical
at the present time, they evidence a desire to see international differences settled
by judicial or arbitral means. The most important single mechanism today that is
contributing to this end is the International Court of Justice, and this article
proposes to give a brief picture of the Court for the enlightenment of the practic-
ing American lawyer.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
One basic premise must be accepted: there is an international law. Almost at
the commencement of our life as a nation, the United States Supreme Court
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declared that the United States is "amenable to the law of nations."' As Mr.
Justice Gray said in The Paquete Habana: "International law is part of our law,
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriatejurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented
for their determination."2 In point of fact this has been the practice of our courts,
both federal and state, throughout our history.8 The American Law Institute has
just finished and approved a Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, a volume of over 700 pages, dealing with certain phases of inter-
national law and its domestic impact in the United States. For those who may
doubt the reality of this branch of the law this extremely valuable compendium
will supply convincing proof of the existence of an international law dealing
with such subjects as international agreements (analogous to an international law
of contracts), responsibilities of states (analogous to an international law of
torts), as well as with the jurisdiction of states and recognition of states and
governments, 4 which are subjects without close analogy in domestic law.
The fact that no international legislature exists, though sometimes cited as
tending to discredit the concept of international law, should not cause an Ameri-
can lawyer concern as to the existence of international law, for he well knows that
the fundamental principles of many branches of our domestic law have their
origin not in legislative action but in the common law; and international law is,
in a very real sense, the common law of mankind. Neither the inability to get a
certain state into court as defendant in a particular case nor the lack of an inter-
national executive to enforce the law and the judgments of the Court should belie
the existence of that law or the utility of that Court to a lawyer who is familiar
with the concept of the existence of a right without a remedy or who has tried to
serve process on a defendant who remains without the jurisdiction, or collect
a judgment against an absent defendant with no visible assets within the juris-
diction.
' Chief Justice Jay in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 474 (1793).
2The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
8 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (sovereign
powers); Wildenhus Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887) (jurisdiction over a crime committed on a vessel in
foreign waters); The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (on
sovereign immunity); Lambros Seaplane Base v. The Batory, 215 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1954) (salvage
of seaplanes); Bergman v. DeSieyes, 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948) (diplomatic immunity); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F.Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), afl'd 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir.
1962) (nationalization of foreign property contrary to international law); United States v. Ushi
Shiroma, 123 F.Supp. 145 (D. Hawaii 1954) (interpretation of the Japanese Peace Treaty,
nationality and transfer of sovereignty); Royal Holland Lloyd v. United States, 73 Ct. Cl. 722(1931) (international claims); Luckhart v. Hooradian, 92 Cal.App.2d 501, 207 P.2d 579 (1949)(interpretation of a treaty and construction of the award of an international commission established
thereunder); Peters v. McKay, 195 Ore. 412, 238 P.2d 225 (1951) (effect of war in suspending
statute of limitations); Molina v. Comision Reguladora del Mercado de Henequen, 92 N.J.L. 38,104 A. 450 (1918) (the Act of State Doctrine and retroactive effect of recognition of a govern-
ment); State ex rel. Kain v. Hall, 65 Tenn. 3 (1873) (authority of the conquering power, under
the laws of war, to appoint civil officials).
'Throughout this article, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the term "state" is used
in the international sense rather than as referring to one of the states of the United States.
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International law is observed very much in the same manner as is our domestic
law. Every foreign office in civilized, law-abiding countries governs its daily
actions and decisions by international law.5 It respects rights of aliens, it recog-
nizes the jurisdiction of other states over their territory and their nationals, and
it observes its treaty obligations. Furthermore, when in the past there has been
such international disagreement as to result in litigation in the Permanent Court
of International Justice or the International Court of Justice, the state against
whom judgment has been rendered6 has, save in one case, 7 complied with it in
spite of the lack of an international executive to enforce the judgment.
Thus we see that there is an international law with real vitality and effect,
governing the daily conduct of nations, interpreted and applied by courts, both
international and national, and indeed having sufficient importance to the Ameri-
can lawyer to call for employment of the familiar and valuable technique of a
Restatement.
JURISDICTION OF COURT OVER STATES
Now let us turn to the International Court of Justice. Its predecessor, the
Permanent Court of International Justice, functioned from 1922 to 1946 under
the League of Nations. Although we were not members of the League or parties
to the Court, the United States supplied it with such illustrious judges as Charles
Evans Hughes, Frank B. Kellogg, John Bassett Moore and Manley 0. Hudson.
When the United Nations was formed, the International Court of Justice took
the place of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and was very nearly
a "Chinese copy" of it.
The Statute of the present Court is annexed to and forms a part of the Charter
of the United Nations,8 and all members of the United Nations are ipso facto
parties to the Statute of the Court (i.e., entitled to use it).9 States not members
5 As an example, see some of the problems considered by the Legal Adviser of the Department
of State early in 1955 with respect to the Far East. (1955) Proceedings of the Am. Soc'y Int'l
L. 98-99.
0 U.N. CHARTER art. 94 (59 Stat. 1031, 1051) (1945) gives the Security Council, on applica-
tion of a successful party in a suit before the International Court of Justice, the power to "make
recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment." This proce-
dure has never been used successfully, and only once was invoked-by the United Kingdom to
attempt to secure compliance by Iran with interim measures of protection (i.e., temporary injunc-
tion). Note, however, that under Article 94 of the Charter, "Each Member of the United Nations
undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which
it is a party."
In the Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, 244 the Court in its opinion held Albania
responsible to the United Kingdom for mining the waters of the Channel (which it held to be
international straits), thus causing damage to British naval vessels and injuries and death to their
crews. In a later opinion the Court ordered damages to be paid to the United Kingdom, assessed
at £ 844,000. Albania refused to pay, asserting that its submission to the jurisdiction of the Court
did not include jurisdiction to assess damages. See text accompanying note 70 infra.
' The Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice are
found at 50 Stat. 1031 (1945). Article 92 of the Charter provides that the Court "shall function
in accordance with the annexed Statute, which . .. forms an integral part of the present Charter."
U.N. CHARTER art. 93, para. 1. This is to be distinguished from submission to the jurisdiction
of the Court, discussed below.
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of the United Nations may be permitted to become parties to the Statute of theCourt on conditions laid down by the General Assembly on recommendation of
the Security Council,O and Switzerland, Liechtenstein and San Marino have done
so. Since international law deals only with rights and obligations of states (and
more recently of international organizations) only states may be parties in casesbefore the Court," although the United Nations and certain of its organs and
specialized agencies may request advisory opinions,2 and any public international
organization may furnish the Court information relevant to a case before it."3Every state is sovereign, and there is no way of bringing it before any court,international or national, except by its own consent. This is basic to the concept
of sovereignty. The Statute of the Court provides 14 that one way of consenting tothe jurisdiction of the Court is by a special agreement of the parties referring theparticular dispute to the Court for decision, or a treaty provision authorizing anyparty to the treaty to refer a dispute arising under it to the Court. The UnitedStates is party to a substantial number of bilateral and multilateral agreementsproviding that disputes arising thereunder may be referred to the International
Court of Justice.',
Paragraph (2) of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court provides a second
method of consenting to jurisdiction-a document filed with the United Nations
which recognizes as compulsory, in relation to any other state accepting the
same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach
of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation.
The United States has followed this procedure as well as some thirty-seven
other countries.' 6
CONNALLY AMENDMENT
When the matter of general acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction was before
the United States Senate, the Committee on Foreign Relations considered a
resolution which contained the language of paragraph (2) of Article 36 of the
10 U.N. CHARTEn art. 93, para. 2.
11 STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 34, para. 1.
12 U.N. CHARTER art. 96.
"STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 34, para. 2.
"STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 36, para. 1.
"See list in 106 CONG. REc. 10381, 19385-86 (1960).
"As of January 1, 1962. See Treaties in Force on January 1, 1962, Dept. of State Publication7327, p. 252.
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Statute of the Court quoted above, but with the following provisos added:
Provided, That such declaration should not apply to -
a. disputes the solution of which the parties shall entrust to other tribunals
by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be concluded
in the future; or
b. disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domes-
tic jurisdiction of the United States.
Provided further, that such declaration should remain in force for a period of
five years and thereafter until the expiration of six months after notice may
be given to terminate the declaration.'
7
The proviso in paragraph a was merely including in the declaration what
is expressly set forth in Article 95 of the Charter of the United Nations, and
the proviso in paragraph b likewise was only a reaffirmation of the domestic
jurisdiction exception found in Article 2 (7) of the Charter. The Court, being
an organ of the United Nations,' 8 is under the limitations on that organization
included in its Charter. The final proviso placing a potential time limit on the
declaration was expressly permitted by Article 36 (3) of the Statute of the
Court.
In reporting out the resolution in the form indicated above the Committee
pointed out that:
The question of what is properly a matter of international law is, in case of
dispute, appropriate for decision by the Court itself, since, if it were left to
the decision of each individual state, it would be possible to withhold any
case from adjudication on the plea that it is a matter of domestic jurisdiction.
It is plainly the intention of the statute that such questions should be decided
by the court, since Article 36, paragraph 6, provides: 'In the event of a dis-
pute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by
the decision of the Court.' . . . The committee therefore decided that a
reservation of the right of decision as to what are matters essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction would tend to defeat the purposes which it is hoped
to achieve by means of the proposed declaration as well as the purpose of
Article 36, paragraphs 2 and 6, of the Statute of the Court.
19
Nevertheless, on the floor of the Senate the question was raised whether the
Court should be permitted to decide this issue.
20 Immigration and the tariff
were cited as matters which the Court might say were not domestic; but Senator
Thomas pointed out that the Court could not act on either (in the absence of
a treaty on the subject to which the United States was a party) since "there
is no international law dealing with the subject(s )."21 Senator Connally, how-
ever, thought the Court might decide they Were international questions, and he
17 S. Res. 196, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
18 U.N. CHA"TER art. 7, para. 1; art. 92; STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 1.
19 S. REP. No. 1835, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1946).
"0 92 CONG. REC. 10557 (1946).
21 Id., 10615.
19621
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also raised the question of navigation through, and tolls for use of, the Panama
Canal. He proposed to amend proviso b by adding eight words at the end so
that it would read:
b. disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domesticjurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the United
States of America.22
The amendment was adopted and the resolution passed as amended. 23
It must be emphasized that the Connally Amendment consisted only of the
last eight words, and the issues that have been so much under discussion by a
number of American bar associations involve only those words, not the rest of
proviso b. There has been much misunderstanding on this point. The Charter
categorically states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter [of which the Statute of the Courtis "an integral part"-Art. 92] shall authorize the United Nations [or theCourt as one of its principal organs-Art. 7] to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require theMembers to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.24
The question therefore is not whether the Court should be allowed to havejurisdiction of matters which are within the domestic jurisdiction of the United
States. It is expressly forbidden to act in such matters. The proviso of our
declaration of acceptance of jurisdiction but without the Connally Amendment
would, of course, re-emphasize this limitation, but it would not create it. The
question is whether it is either appropriate or realistic for the United States
to try to reserve the right to determine for itself whether a matter is essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States and hence not within thejurisdiction of the Court, or whether, as provided in Article 36 (6) of the Statute
of the Court (to which the United States had previously unqualifiedly ad-
hered ), 2 5 "In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction,
the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court." Has anything of sub-
stance been accomplished by purporting to accept general compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the Court if we reserve to ourselves the right in any case not only to
tell the Court that we consider the matter is essentially within our domesticjurisdiction but thereby to deprive the Court of the jurisdiction we purported
to give it? Is not our acceptance illusory and hence of no legal effect?
The issue of the repeal of the Connally Amendment will not be discussed
at length. Nevertheless it should be pointed out that if it were considered vital
to guard against the possibility that the Court would deal with our tariff, our
immigration and our Panama Canal, however improbable that might be, the
"Id., 10624. Words added by the Connally Amendment emphasized.
"Id., 10697. See Declaration of Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction, 61 Stat. 1218 (1947).
"U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7).
2"59 Stat. 1031 (1945).
[Vol. 3
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problem could have been handled in another manner. These matters could
have been specifically excepted from our acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction.
This technique, however, was not followed; instead we not only placed our-
selves in an equivocal status vis-a-vis the Court but provided an example, of
dubious validity, which was followed by others. Mexico, Liberia, South Africa,
Pakistan, the Sudan, the United Kingdom, France and India all incorporated
similar language in their declarations of acceptance of jurisdiction. Recently,
however, the last three, recognizing it was unwise to maintain it, have dropped
their "Connally Amendment."
26
LEGAL EFFECr OF THE CONNALLY AMENDMENT
Before leaving the point it should be noted that during the period France
still had its "Connally Amendment" it sued Norway on bonds issued by Nor-
way.27 Norway (as is true of practically all states) had a reciprocity provision
in its acceptance of jurisdiction. It therefore contended that its obligation to
submit to the Court's jurisdiction in the particular case brought by France was
no greater than the obligation assumed by France; that France had the right to
determine for itself whether the issue was one of domestic jurisdiction and
therefore Norway had such a right in the instant case; and that Norway did
determine the issue was one of domestic jurisdiction, and hence by virtue of
this unilateral determination the Court had no jurisdiction. This contention was
upheld by the Court, and France, to employ a colloquialism, was hoist by its
own petard. Judge Lauterpacht of the United Kingdom went so far as to say
the acceptance of jurisdiction not only was contrary to Article 36 (6) of the
Statute of the Court but it gave rise to no legal obligation, as the matter of
jurisdiction is left for unilateral determination; and since the provision is an
essential part of the acceptance the entire acceptance is invalid.
In the Interhandel Case, subsequently decided by the Court,
28 the United
States, relying upon its Connally Amendment language, took the position that
one of the issues raised was a matter of domestic jurisdiction as determined by
the United States. Although the opinion of the Court expressed no view upon
this point since the decision went on another ground, Judge Lauterpacht, in a
separate opinion, again stated his position on the invalidity of our acceptance
of jurisdiction, and was joined in this view by Judge Spender of Australia in
his own separate opinion. The Swiss, Norwegian and Uruguayan judges in
their separate opinions also thought the Connally Amendment language in-
valid, but thought it was severable, and that the rest of the declaration of
'8 Report of the Special Committee on World Peace through Law on the Connally Amendment
to the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, submitted to the House of Delegates of
the American Bar Association, August 1960, p. 8.
17 Case of Norwegian Loans, [1957] I.C.J. Rep. 9.
'8 Interhandel Case, [1959] I.C.J. Rep. 6.
1962]
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acceptance of jurisdiction might stand-in short, that the Senate had accom-
plished nothing by the amendment.
Thus we see that not only has the Court itself shed doubt on the validity
of the Connally Amendment, but it has virtually held that if the United States
sues another state which may have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court, that state, if it has the usual provision putting its acceptance of juris-diction on a reciprocal basis, may use our declaration to claim the matter is
essentially one of its domestic jurisdiction as determined by itself, and we are
thereby thrown out of court by the unilateral statement of the defendant.
In our own self interest should we not follow the example of the UnitedKingdom, France and India and withdraw our Connally Amendment? Its repeal
was advocated by the American Bar Association as early as 1947,29 and this
position was re-afmirmed after much serious debate in 1960.30 This also is theposition taken by the Federal Bar Association in 1961 31 and by the AmericanSociety of International Law on repeated occasions.3 2 President Eisenhower
urged the repeal of the Amendment in his State of the Union Message in 1960,
and the present administration did likewise in a letter dated March 15, 1961,
to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.38
THE JUDGES
There are fifteen judges on the International Court of Justice, serving nine
year terms. Five are elected every three years by the General Assembly andby the Security Council of the United Nations, each voting independently. 4
They are nominated by the national groups, each of four persons, who are
members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.3 Not more than four nomi-
nations may be submitted by any national group, nor more than two of their
own nationality. 6 The judges are to be chosen "regardless of nationality from
among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required
in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or
0 See 33 A.B.A.J. 249 (1947).80 See (1960) A.B.A. REP. 321-328 and 286-287; and see debate in articles in 46 A.B.A.J.
184, 486, 729, 732, 737, 741, 744, 749, and 852 (1960)." The Federal Bar News for June, 1961, states: "This past month, after giving a full oppor-
tunity to all chapters to consider and vote on the question of the repeal of the Connally Reserva-tion, the [Federal Bar Association National] Council debated and voted overwhemlingly in support
of the repeal of the Reservation."
8 See, for example, (1959) Proceedings of Amer. Soc'y Int'l L. 330.8 Report, op. cif. supra note 26, at 7-8.
84 STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 3, para. 1, art. 4, para. 1, art. 8, art. 13, para. 1. The vote isnot subject to veto in the Security Council. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 10, para. 2.8' STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 4, para. 1. The Statute in Art. 6 states: "Before making thesenominations, each national group is recommended to consult its highest court of justice, its legalfaculties and schools of law, and its national academies and national sections of internationalacademies devoted to the study of law." For the procedure followed by the U.S. group in carryingout this recommendation in connection with the 1960 elections see 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 445.80 STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 5, para. 2.
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are jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law." 7 No two
judges may be nationals of the same state.8 8 For a particular case a state which
is a party and which has no representation on the Court may appoint a judge
ad hoc.39
The caliber of people who have thus been chosen is truly imposing. Of the
present Court, two were former presidents of their states, one a prime minister,
and another a cabinet member. One was chief justice of his country's highest
court. Five had served as their country's delegate in the United Nations or
League of Nations, and five had been on the International Law Commission.
Five were former legal advisers to their respective foreign offices or embassies.
Five had served their countries as ambassadors. The great majority also have
reputations as professors or scholars in the field of international law.40
The listing will undoubtedly raise this question in the minds of many
lawyers: Why is there only one member of the Court who had previously
held a high judicial office? It of course is desirable to have men on the Court
with such experience; but it should be noted that three members of the present
Court have been sitting since it was organized in 1946, thus qualifying them
with greater judicial experience on a high court in the international field than
any other living person. Two others have had seven years experience on the
Court, and three more have had five years. Thus nine of the fifteen members
should qualify today as having had high judicial experience. It should also be
remembered that the field of law with which the Court deals is a bit unique,
and it could well be said that service on the International Law Commission
(which is engaged in codifying international law in convention form) or as
legal adviser to a foreign office should qualify a person at least as much as
service on a court which had few if any cases in the international law field.
Four more members qualify under this assumption, making a total of thirteen
whom we may say are well qualified. There remain only two, one member
who had risen from law professor to become President of Peru, and Dr. Philip C.
Jessup, member from the United States, who was an outstanding professor of
international law at Columbia, had been special adviser to the Secretary of
State with the rank of Ambassador, and had served as our representative in
the United Nations. They, too, seem to have qualifying backgrounds to make
them very valuable additions to the Court.
The Statute of the Court notes that in electing the judges it should be borne
in mind "that in the body as a whole the representation of the main forms of
civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world should be assured."41
The five permanent members of the Security Council (United States, United
87 STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 2.
-88 STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 3, para. 1.
89 STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 31, paras. 2, 3.
40 See Appendix.
" STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 9.
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Kingdom, France, China and the Soviet Union) have always been represented.
Latin America has had four (at present Argentina, Mexico, Panama and Peru).
The British Commonwealth, Western Europe, the Middle East, and the satel-
lites as a group have had one each (now Australia, Italy, Egypt and Poland).
The other two are at present from Greece and Japan.42 Thus there are threejudges from common-law countries, two from Communist law countries, seven
from Roman law countries, two from Asian law countries, and one from an
Islamic law area. Yet with all these diverse cultures and legal systems the
opinions of the Court reflect the type of clear exposition of the facts, careful
delineation of the issues, and logical development of the decision that we find
in the best appellate courts of this country. The judges show the same inde-
pendence and penchant for concurring and dissenting opinions that our own
Supreme Court has displayed. Although the cases all have strong political
overtones and the Judges have their natural predilections, the product of the
Court is not political but legal,43 though reflecting the wisdom gained by so
many of its members from years of practical experience in the arena of inter-
national politics.
The question at once comes to mind, in reviewing the geographical distribu-
tion of the seats on the Court: What about Africa? Only the Egyptian judge,
who has been on the Court from the beginning, has so far represented that
continent. There are now thirty-two African states (exclusive of South Africa)
that are members of the United Nations. How many of these may be able to
proffer a qualified candidate for the Court is another question, but Liberia, the
Sudan and undoubtedly others have able lawyers and jurists. At the next
election a drive may be expected for African representation more nearly equal
to that of the twenty States of Latin America which have four seats, or at least
equal to that of the eighteen States of Asia which have two. One proposal
is to enlarge the Court. Although this could result in its becoming unwieldy, it
may be the practical solution, as it is always difficult to get a group to sur-
render any seats traditionally held. It seems likely that the recognition of the
ability of European judges, which in the past has given that continent the
preponderance of the seats not only on the present Court but on the Permanent
Court of International Justice, will continue to maintain this situation for the
foreseeable future. Practical international politics in any event should assure
this result.
The Court elects its President and Vice-President, who serve for three
" ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT, 49-55, 213-216 (1960).
,8 A study made in 1960 points out that up to that time there had been 47 separate issues onwhich judges who were nationals of contesting States had voted, resulting in 96 votes by suchjudges. In 21 of the 96 votes the judge voted against the position advocated by his countrybecause he thought it wrong on the law; and in only 31 of the 96 votes did he, alone or withothers, support his country against the view of the majority of the Court. (Contentious ProceedingsBefore the International Court of Justice, World Rule of Law Center, 1960.)
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years and are eligible for re-election. 4 4 In practice these officers have changed
every three years. The Court also appoints its Registrar and other admin-
istrative officers.4 5 There are the usual provisions restricting outside activity
of the judges, prohibiting them from acting as counsel and guarding against
conflicting interests, 46 while on the other hand they are insured against dis-
missal except for cause.47 The members of the Court while on official business
enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities. 48  Although the formation of
chambers and the holding of sessions away from the seat of the Court are
authorized, 49 in practice the full court sits at The Hague on all cases. The
salaries and expenses of the Court are met from the United Nations budget. 50
PROCEDURE
A case is commenced either by filing a special agreement of the parties
submitting the matter to the decision of the Court or by filing "a written
application."51 Notice of the filing is sent not only to the parties but to all
members of the United Nations and to other States entitled to appear in the
case.
52
One noticeable difference between proceedings in this Court and those
before domestic tribunals is that the parties are represented by "agents" who,
however, "may have the assistance of counsel or advocates before the Court."55
The agent is the government's representative with whom all communication is
had, even though there be also counsel or advocates. The Court assumes he
has full power to bind his government and that he acts for it in all matters. If
the state's ambassador at The Hague is not the agent, that ambassador or other
"competent authority" of the government must attest the appointment of the
agent which is filed with the Court.5 4 In recent practice the United States has
appointed the Legal Adviser of the Department of State as its agent, and he
has also handled any oral proceedings rather than using any other counsel or
advocate. This is one of the rare cases in which the United States is not repre-
sented in court by the Department of Justice. There is, however, close coordi-
nation between the Legal Adviser and the Attorney General on any aspects
of interest to the latter.
There are no pleadings in the sense familiar to the American attorney.
"STAT. INTL CT. JUST. art. 21, para. 1.
"STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 21, para. 21.
"STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. arts. 16, 17, 24.
"STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 18.
"STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 19.
"STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. arts. 26, 22.
50 STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. arts. 32, 33.
5' STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 40, para. 1.
" STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 40, paras. 2, 3.
"3STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 42, paras. 1, 2.
5' Rules of Court, art. 32 (3). The Rules of Court may be found in the Court's Yearbook:
[1950-1951] I.C.J.Y.B. 235-262.
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Rather a brief statement of "the subject of the dispute and the parties" is filed
at the time of the original application or submission to the Court,"5 followed,
within time limits set by the Court in each case, by a "memorial" by the party
instituting the suit, a "counter-memorial" by each other party, a "reply" by the
first party and a "rejoinder" by the others. 56 The memorial is an extremely
elaborate document consisting of (1) a rather exhaustive statement of the facts,
(2) affidavits and certified documentation to prove the facts, (3) a statement
of the law, with argumentation, citation and quotation of authorities, and
(4) submission of conclusions. It acts as pleading, proof and brief. The counter-
memorial should admit or deny the facts and reply to the law stated in the
memorial; and also should set out, again rather elaborately, its own facts,
proof, law and submissions.5 7 The reply and rejoinder, in sequence, are much
briefer and should merely answer points in the other party's documentation not
already covered. The memorial, counter-memorial, reply and rejoinder must
be printed in English or French. 58
If there are oral proceedings, as is usually the case, the Court may ask
that a copy of the argument-in-chief to be made by each party be submitted
to it before the hearing starts. This facilitates translation, as both English and
French are official languages of the Court59 and unless otherwise agreed all
statements are given in one of these languages and translated into the other.60
Since translation is not simultaneous and the speeches are formal and tend to
be lengthy, the oral hearings may run many days. For example, in a recent
case seven States, including the United States, argued orally. The arguments
began on April 26, 1962, and continued on six subsequent days, concluding on
May 4.61 Questions from the Court are very few, and the member wishing to
ask one passes the word to the President who then announces that Judge so-
and-so wishes to ask a question. 62 In the hearing of the case just mentioned
only two questions were asked.65 Although the rules permit the calling of
witnesses and experts,6 4 the usual practice is to rely upon the memorial and
counter-memorial to cover all the evidence.
The oral proceedings are conducted in a public session, and the same is
true of the subsequent reading of the Court's opinion.65
"STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 40, para. 1.
"STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 43, para. 2; Rules of Court, art. 41.
'¢ Rules of Court, arts. 42, 43, para. 1.
"I Rules of Court, art. 43, para. 2.
59 STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 39.
1o Rules of Court, art. 58.
61 ADVISORY OPINION: CONSTITUTION OF THE MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE OF THE INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL MARITIME CONSULTATIVE ORGANIZATION-PLEADINGS, ARGUMENTS AND Docu-
MENTS 262-440 (I.C.J. 1960). Rules of Court, art. 52.
0Rules of Court, art. 52.
"ADVISORY OPINION, op. cit. supra note 61, at 394 and 419.
"Rules of Court, arts. 49, 53, 54.
"5 STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. arts. 46, 58.
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All the papers in the case, the orders and minutes of proceedings of the
Court, a complete transcript of the oral proceedings, and the opinion of the
Court are published by the Court. The orders, minutes and opinion of the
Court appear in both English and French, the rest in the one of those languages
in which it was written or spoken originally.
SOURCES OF LAW
Article 38, after observing that it is the function of the Court "to decide in
accordance with international law" the disputes submitted to it, states that the
Court shall apply:
a. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. Subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law.
The American lawyer should have no difficulty with paragraph a for in
effect it states that in appropriate situations contracts govern transactions
between the parties. Bearing in mind, as has been explained above, that it is
the practice of foreign offices to govern their conduct by their concepts of
international law, it can be seen that a general practice of nations-"international
custom"-as stated in paragraph b, is a sound criterion to be invoked by the
Court; and in any event a usage of long standing, of course, can establish a
standard of conduct.6 6 Paragraph c has caused much academic discussion, but
there definitely are certain general basic principles found running through the
legal systems of practically all civilized nations, and there should be no real
objection to using them when applicable in the international sphere. Paragraph
d may seem a bit incongruous by putting writings of legal publicists on a par
with decisions of courts in determining the law; but the Roman law and indeed
most legal systems other than those with a common-law tradition rely far more
on writings of those learned in the subject than on decisions of courts. In the
International Court of Justice, which must function as the supreme melting pot
to reduce to a common base all the legal systems of the world, the common-
law countries can hardly complain if our traditional source of authority is rated
at least on a par with one traditional to the other systems.
It also should be pointed out to the American lawyer that the Article refers
to these two sources of international law as "subsidiary means" for the determi-
"6The United States Supreme Court stated in The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900):
"By an ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago, and gradually ripening into
a rule of international law, coast fishing vessels, pursuing their vocation of catching and bringing in
fresh fish, have been recognized as exempt, with their cargoes and crews, from capture as prize of
war . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 686.
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nation of rules of law. To have judicial decisions relegated to this category
probably shocks the American attorney, but this is only a reflection of interna-
tional law practice of long standing. There has never been a doctrine of stare
decisis in international law, and this principle underlies Article 59 of the Statute
which expressly provides that a decision of the Court "has no binding force
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case." This again
reflects the practice in other legal systems where the weight given judicial
precedent in common-law countries is not recognized. However, in point of
fact, the International Court of Justice has almost invariably followed its prece-
dents and those of the Permanent Court of International Justice.
CERTAIN CASES DECIDED BY TIlE COURT
The substantive matters with which the Court deals are as broad in scope
as international law itself; a summary of a few decided cases will illustrate
this diversity. The facts and issues have been reduced to simplest terms for
this purpose, and merely show the type of case and the tenor of the decision.
The United States first became directly involved in a case before the Court
when France sought a definition of our treaty rights in Morocco, then a French
Protectorate. 7 We contended that under our treaties the import license con-
trols which France had recently imposed in Morocco could not be applied to
our nationals without our consent. The Court rejected this claim, but sustained
our next contention by holding that the controls were contrary to our treaty
with Morocco of 183668 and the General Act of Algeciras of 190669 since they
discriminated against the United States in favor of France. The scope of our
then-existing extra-territorial consular court jurisdiction was also involved. The
Court upheld our right to try cases where all parties involved were Americans
or persons protected by the United States, but rejected our contention that the
consular court could try cases where only the defendant was an American.
Next consider The Minquiers and The Ecrehos Case.70 The Minquiers and
the Ecrehos are two groups of islands in the English Channel off the coast of
France. The Court was asked to determine whether they belonged to the
United Kingdom or to France. The evidence went back to the Norman
Conquest in 1066. The case was argued largely on the basis of treaties that
had been entered into between the two countries in the Middle Ages, but the
Court based its decision on the direct evidence of possession and actual exercise
of sovereignty, and awarded them to the United Kingdom.
The Corfu Channel Case 71 was one of the most serious threats to the peace
67 Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, [1952]
I.C.J. Rep. 176.
S8 Stat. 484 (1836).
6 34 Stat. 2905 (1906).
70 [1953] I. C. J. Rep. 47.
71 [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4. See note 7 supra.
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dealt with by the Court. Mines were sown in the Corfu Channel along the
Albanian coast. British naval vessels passing through the Channel hit them
and were badly damaged. Forty-four members of the crews were killed and
forty-two injured. The Court held Albania responsible. Its holding that there
was a right of innocent passage in territorial waters which constitute inter-
national straits connecting two bodies of the high seas is now reflected in the
text of the Geneva Convention of 1958 on the Territorial Sea.
7 2
Another case also affected the drafting of that Convention, and that was
the Fisheries Case.73 The United Kingdom protested a method prescribed in
a Norwegian decree for drawing baselines along its coast from which the
width of its territorial sea was to be measured to the seaward. The decree
provided that Norway had exclusive fishing rights in that territorial sea. It
established baselines measured from outer point to outer point on islands off
the coast, thus extending the territorial sea much further seaward than if the
normal method of drawing baselines along the coast were followed. The Court,
however, found that the Norwegian coast did not constitute, as in most coun-
tries, a clear dividing line between land and sea because of some 120,000
islands, rocks and reefs offshore. It held that for the purpose of a baseline
these really constituted the coast, and upheld the method adopted as not con-
trary to international law. This principle is now stated in Article 4 of the
Convention on the Territorial Sea.
74
Turning now to an Advisory Opinion requested by the General Assembly of
the United Nations 7 the Court was asked to deal with questions raised by the
assassination in Palestine of Count Bernadotte, a Swedish national, who was at
the time functioning as United Nations Palestine Mediator. The most significant
point decided was that the United Nations had the capacity to bring an inter-
national claim against the state responsible for the death of its mediator with
a view to obtaining reparation for damage caused to the United Nations and
to the victim. Though there was no express language on the point in the
Charter, the Court said that the Organization must have the international
personality and capacity to carry out its functions and protect its rights. It
recognized that usually the claim on behalf of the victim or persons entitled
through him would be advanced by the state of his nationality, but the United
Nations was deemed also to have this capacity in the case of one in its service
who suffered injury or death while acting for it, since it was essential to the
discharge of the Organization's functions that it give suitable support and
protection to its agents entrusted with important missions in disturbed parts
of the world.
Latin American Nations have also been before the Court. Perhaps the most
72 Not yet in force. For text see 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 834 (1958), particularly art. 16, para. 4.
78 [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116.
11 52 Am. J. INT'L L. 834 at 835 (1958).
7 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 174.
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interesting case being the one involving the boundary dispute between Nica-
ragua and Honduras,7 6 a source of friction for over 50 years. Under an 1894
Treaty the countries had agreed to have a Mixed Boundary Commission settle
and demarcate their common boundary. The Commission completed a substan-
tial part of their work, but they could not agree upon one section of the
boundary. The Treaty, however, had provided for arbitration in the event of
this contingency, the aribtrator (under certain conditions) to be the King of
Spain. The King was appointed. He handed down a decision on December 23,
1906, which was generally favorable to Honduras. Nicaragua before the Court
claimed the award invalid on two grounds: (1) that the designation of the
King was not in conformity with the conditions for such selection laid down
in the Treaty, and (2) that the Treaty in any event had lapsed before the
King agreed to act as arbitrator. The Court held that those representatives of
the two countries who had met and decided the King should be requested to
act and who, according to the minutes of their meeting, felt the requirements
of the Treaty had been complied with, were authorized to make that decision
with binding effect. Furthermore, the point was never raised by Nicaragua
until March 12, 1912, long after the date of the decision. As to the second
point, the Treaty by its terms was to run for ten years. The King agreed to
act as arbitrator on a date more than ten years from the date of signature of
the Treaty but less than ten years from the date of exchange of ratifications.
The Treaty was silent as to when it came into force. The Court held it was
the intention of the parties that it should not come into force until exchange
of ratifications, and therefore ruled against Nicaragua. Other points raised by
Nicaragua were overruled, and the award of the King was held valid.
Finally we might look at a case from Asia. Portugal sued India claiming
interference with her claimed right of passage over Indian territory from the
coast to two Portuguese enclaves within India, Dadra and Nagar-Aveli.17 The
evidence went back to certain decrees and alleged agreements of the eighteenth
century. The practice over the intervening years was shown. The Court found
that, at least since the British came into control in India, Portugal had been
allowed free passage for goods and civilians, and this having been a practice
for over a century and a quarter was accepted as the law. But as to armed
forces, armed police, and arms and ammunition the Court found that passage
had been by special agreement or on the basis of reciprocity, not of right, and
therefore held there was no right of passage for them. Finally it found no
interference by India with Portugal's rights as thus determined.
The range of cases that may come before the Court is only barely touched
by such summaries. Some of the other decided cases, for instance, go into such
76 Case Concerning the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906,
[19601 I.C.J. Rep. 192.
17 Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian Territory, [1960] I. C. J. Rep. 6.
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matters as the grant of nationality by a state.
78 the assessment of Members of
the United Nations for their share of the cost of the Congo operation,
79 the
granting of asylum in a friendly embassy to a leader of a rebellion in the
country where the embassy was located,
0 and the interpretation of the peace
treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania.
8 It is obvious that the Court
has a field within which it can resolve, according to law, international differ-
ences of a great many patterns.
Perhaps some will raise the question whether there can be an appeal from
the United States Supreme Court, or the Supreme Court of one of the States
of the Union, to the International Court of Justice. Cases never go to that
Court by appeal from a national court, but the same (or substantially the
same) issue that is presented to the national court may, in certain circumstances,
come before the International Court of Justice. A potential case of this char-
acter has already arisen. The Alien Property Custodian during World War II
blocked, and after the war vested, the stock of General Aniline and Film Cor-
poration, which had been owned by a Swiss corporation known as Interhandel.
The contention was that Interhandel was, in turn, owned and controlled by
I. G. Farbenindustrie, a German company, and hence an alien enemy. This was
disputed by Interhandel and also by Switzerland. While Interhandel was
pursuing its statutory remedy in our federal courts, the Swiss were pressing
the claim through diplomatic channels. In the suit Interhandel was ordered to
produce certain records from Switzerland, but it claimed this was forbidden
by, and was a criminal offense under, Swiss law. For its failure to do so, after
repeated extensions of time, the federal court, acting under Rule 37 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,8 2 ordered the case dismissed. The case went
to the United States Supreme Court, but meanwhile Switzerland had brought
suit against the United States in the International Court of Justice. The Supreme
Court held that Rule 37 did not authorize a dismissal where the failure to
produce was due to inability, not wilfulness, bad faith, or any fault of the
petitioner. It remanded the case for further proceedings.
8 3  The case in the
International Court of Justice was thereupon disposed of by the Court up-
holding the preliminary objection of the United States that Interhandel, whose
cause Switzerland was espousing, had not yet exhausted the local remedies
available to it in United States courts.
8 4 However, if the matter is not satis-
18 Nottebohm Case, [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 4.
79 Advisory Opinion: Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Judgment of July 20, 1962.
80 Asylum Case, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 266.
81 Interpretation of Peace Treaties, [19501 I.C.J. Rep. 65, 221.
82 Rule 37, in material part, provided: ". . . If any paity . . . refuses to 
obey . . . an order
made under Rule 34 to produce any document or other thing for inspection . . ., the court 
may
make such orders in regard to the refusal as are just, and among others the following: . . . (iii)
An order . . . dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof .
8s Societe Internationale etc. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
"I Interhandel Case, [1959] I. C. J. Rep. 6.
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factorily adjusted in our courts or by a mutual settlement, Switzerland may
again raise the issue in the International Court after local remedies have been
exhausted. While technically the issues are different in the two forums, since
in our courts the question is whether the property was properly vested under
our statutes while in the International Court the issue is whether the United
States is under an international obligation to restore the propery to Interhandel,
the substantial question in both cases is the same-are we entitled to the
property or is Interhandel?
USE OF THE COURT
Before closing let a word of caution be injected. There seems to be a feelingin certain quarters that the Court can be used as an alternative to armed
conflict. Most issues that are headed for serious armed conflict are basically
political and cannot be taken to court. There is nothing in the Congo, or in
Algeria, or in Vietnam that is susceptible of juridical solution. Situations like
Berlin and Cuba have legal issues which could go to the Court, but one side
or the other usually feels the political situation is such, or the prestige or
national honor at stake is so great, that it cannot afford to take the chance-
inherent in any litigation-of a possible adverse decision.
Nevertheless the International Court of Justice has its place in the settlement
of disputes around the world. It should play a much greater role than it does.
The repeal of the Connally Amendment would be a step toward this end, forit would change the posture of the United States from one of an illusory
acceptance of jurisdiction of the Court to one of firm acceptance under the
limits on that jurisdiction established by the Charter and the Statute; from
one of distrust of the Court to one of confidence in it. Furthermore, as the
United States example in adopting the Amendment was followed by others, so
there is reason to hope that its example in enlightened repeal of the Amendment
might be followed by the five other states still having this self-judging reserva-
tion.
There certainly should be greater use of the Court to settle differences with
other states where the issue can be the subject of adjudication and where
prestige, national honor or political objectives are not too heavily involved. It
is recognized that diplomats are trained to negotiate, not to litigate; yet the
threat of possible litigation (where there has been acceptance of compulsoryjurisdiction or where a public offer to litigate would bring the weight of public
opinion to bear) may expedite successful conclusion of negotiations. Certainly
when negotiations reach an impasse, and the case falls within the suggested
limitations, resort to the International Court of Justice seems not only possible
but indeed the wise and sensible course to pursue in a nation's own self-interest
in order to secure resolution of the difficulty and prevent its becoming a con-
tinuing source of international friction.
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Admittedly this is not an easy goal to achieve. The United States is follow-
ing a commendable policy of including in its international agreements clauses
referring disputes arising from the interpretation or application of substantive
treaty rights and obligations to the International Court of Justice for adjudica-
tion. A few litigated cases arising under such provisions might serve as useful
precedents in demonstrating to other nations the advantages of this technique
to dispose of what otherwise might be troublesome causes of international
friction. In point of fact that Court has never had before it a case involving
the United States which went there by virtue of such a Treaty clause.
85
How to bring about in other ways further use of the Court is a problem that
deserves careful study, but is a subject far beyond the scope of this paper. In
this field the United States should take the lead. At the very least it should
develop and utilize means of giving to the International Court of Justice
greater opportunity to advance the rule of law in controversies between states-
a task which it is well equipped to accomplish.
As the Court discharges its increased responsibilities with the impartial legal
judgment and wisdom it has already displayed, and as it continues to respect
the independence, the sovereignty, and the equality of all states, which it surely
will, confidence in resort to its decision will grow among the nations of the
world. With such confidence established, the Court's stature will increase, and
the full measure of its role in the peaceful settlement of adjudicable interna-
tional disputes will be assured.
APPENDIX
The present Members of the International Court of Justice are the following:
Dr. Bohdan Winiarski (Poland): President. On Court since 1946. Dean of law school
and professor of international law.
Dr. Ricardo J. Alfaro (Panama): Vice President. On Court since 1960. President of
Panama, Minister of Justice, legal author, Chairman of International Law Com-
mission.
Dr. Abdel Hamid Badawi (United Arab Republic). On Court since 1946. Roman and
Islamic law professor and scholar, author of books on international law.
Dr. Jules Basdevant (France). On Court since 1946. Professor of international law,
author of legal works, Legal Advisor to Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Dr. Jose Luis Bustamente y Rivero (Peru). On Court since 1961. President of Peru,
professor of law, author of legal works.
Roberto Cordova (Mexico). On Court since 1955. Member of International Law
Commission, Ambassador, legal counsellor of Embassy at Washington.
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (United Kingdom). On Court since 1961. Member of Inter-
national Law Commission, Legal Adviser to Foreign Office, author of legal works,
including The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice.
Dr. Philip C. Jessup (United States). On Court since 1961. United States Ambas-
86 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 794 (1962).
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sador-at-Large, Delegate to the General Assembly of the United Nations, professor
of international law at Columbia, lawyer, author of legal works.
Dr. Wellington V. Koo (China). On Court since 1957. Prime Minister, President of
League of Nations Council.
Dr. Vladmir M. Koretsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). On Court since 1961.
Member of International Law Commission, professor of international law and legal
history, author of legal works.
Dr. L. M. Moreno Quintana (Argentina). On Court since 1955. Judge in Civil and
Commercial Courts, professor of international law, author of legal works.
Dr. M. Gaetano Morelli (Italy). On Court since 1961. Professor of international law,
co-editor of Italian international law review and of treatise on international law.
author of legal works, legal adviser to Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Sir Percy C. Spender (Australia). On Court since 1957. Member of Cabinet, Ambas-
sador to United States, lawyer and legal author.
Dr. Jean Spiropoulos (Greece). On Court since 1957. Member of International Law
Commission, Legal Adviser to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, professor of international
law.
Dr. Paul Kotaro Tanaka (Japan). On Court since 1961. Chief Justice of Supreme
Court, dean and professor of law at Tokyo University, author of legal works.
